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TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 
MARKUS KRAJEWSKI∗ 
Transnational corporations are currently not formally bound by 
international human rights obligations. Instead, states have a duty to protect 
individuals against human rights abuses by third parties, including 
corporations. While it is undisputed that this obligation extends to all 
individuals living on the territory of the respective state, the extraterritorial 
scope of the duty to protect remains contested. This is especially the case for 
human rights violations through transnational business activities. The state 
on whose territory the violation occurs has a duty to protect human rights by 
adopting and implementing labour and environmental laws applicable in that 
state. However, it is less clear if and to what extent the state of the main seat 
of the mother company or the global ordering company — the ‘home state’ 
— also has a human rights duty to regulate transnational business activity. 
This article argues that such a duty can be based on existing human rights 
doctrine and standards of general international law such as the ‘no harm’ 
rule and the due diligence principle. It argues that states have a duty to 
regulate transnational business activities of corporations over which they 
exercise jurisdiction if human rights violations caused by such activities are 
predictable and preventable. In its final part, the article assesses various 
approaches in state practice which could be seen as instruments in the 
fulfilment of the duty to regulate transnational business activities 
I INTRODUCTION 
Fire disasters in textile factories in Pakistan or environmental pollution due to 
oil leakages in the Niger delta in Nigeria demonstrate clearly that global 
business activities are often closely associated with human rights violations. 
However, according to conventional international law doctrine, neither 
multinational enterprises nor local companies are directly bound by 
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international human rights obligations.1 Only states have direct duties based on 
international human rights law. These human rights obligations comprise the 
duty to protect individuals against human rights violations committed by third 
parties, including business enterprises.  
Predominantly, this duty to protect rests on the state in which the human rights 
violation took place. As that state is often seen as lacking the necessary 
capacities to regulate multinational companies or enforce existing regulations, 
or is unwilling to do so, human rights activists and scholars are increasingly 
arguing that the home states of multinational companies also have a duty to 
regulate the extraterritorial activities of companies domiciled in their 
jurisdiction in order to prevent human rights violations or mitigate their 
consequences. In the human rights literature this approach is discussed under 
the heading ‘extraterritorial obligations’ (ETOs) of states.2 However, it will be 
argued that the term ‘extraterritorial’ is misleading as states do not impose 
regulations on, or enforce their laws in, other territories. Similarly, debates 
focusing on the scope of the jurisdiction of states in the context of human rights 
treaties are arguably missing the point. 
The present article will analyse whether, and to what extent, states have a duty 
to regulate the activities of companies of a transnational character in fulfilment 
of the duty to protect against human rights violations. The article is organised 
as follows: Part II introduces a framework to assess a company’s obligations 
and responsibilities with regard to human rights violations occurring in the 
course of transnational business activities. In Part III the general framework of 
human rights obligations, including their extraterritorial dimensions as 
developed in recent jurisprudence and doctrine, will be briefly recalled. Part IV 
then seeks to establish the case for a state duty to regulate transnational business 
activities. It will distinguish the different roles and functions of home and host 
states and discuss both human rights and general international law doctrines 
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which can serve as a basis for a home state’s duty to regulate. Part IV will also 
address whether there are any limitations to such a duty based on the principle 
of non-intervention. In Part V the article will analyse various instruments which 
have been developed in recent state practice and which could be seen as 
examples of how states can discharge their obligations to protect against human 
rights violations caused by transnational business activities. 
II A FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS THROUGH TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS 
ACTIVITIES  
Attempts to address the behaviour of transnational business entities through 
international norms and guidelines date back to the 1970s.3 These norms and 
guidelines would normally address multinational enterprises or transnational 
corporations. More recent approaches cover multinational enterprises and other 
business entities.4 The reason for this broader approach is that many 
transnational business transactions which potentially have negative effects on 
human rights are not conducted within the network of one multinational 
enterprise, but within global supply chains. Addressing human rights violations 
in the supply chain has therefore become a key concern in recent years.  
It is suggested that in general two types of relationship need to be distinguished. 
They are exemplified in two scenarios. The first scenario concerns activities 
which are conducted within a network of companies and corporations forming 
a multinational enterprise.5 The main legal elements of this scenario are 
transnational corporate relationships. A typical example of a human rights 
violation in this context would be a locally incorporated subsidiary of a 
multinational enterprise contributing to the pollution of the environment, thus 
violating the right to health6 and possibly the right to adequate living 
conditions7 of the local people if the pollution destroys farmland or fisheries. If 
the pollution took place because the mother company did not exercise sufficient 
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oversight, tacitly accepted the activities of the local subsidiary, or even actively 
encouraged them, one can argue that the mother company caused or contributed 
to the violations of human rights.8  
The second scenario concerns activities which take place along a global supply 
chain. The enterprises of the supply chain are not connected with each other 
through corporate relationships, but usually through contractual agreements 
specifying the details of a product, its production or distribution.9 A typical 
example of a human rights violation in this context would be a locally 
incorporated supplier of a global ordering company (the buyer) employing 
unsafe working practices because the buyer requires fast and cheap production. 
In this case, the local supplier could violate the right to safe working conditions 
and decent pay,10 while the global buyer could be seen as causing or 
contributing to the human rights violation.11  
Both types of relationship are considered here as examples of transnational 
business activities with implications for human rights. The scenarios involve 
four players with different human rights obligations: two companies and two 
states. The two companies are, on the one hand, the local subsidiary or local 
supplier and, on the other hand, the mother company or global ordering 
company. While the former are often located in developing countries, the latter 
often have their domiciles in industrialised countries.  
The two states involved in these scenarios are the ‘host’ state and the ‘home 
state’.12 The state on whose territory the business activity of the subsidiary or 
the local supplier is located is usually called the ‘host state’. However, it should 
be noted that the term is misleading. It originates from the language of foreign 
direct investment, which considers the state in which the investment takes place 
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Rights, arts 6 and 7. 
11 An example of this type of scenario would be the responsibility of international textile 
companies regarding the collapse of the Rana Plaza in Bangladesh in 2013. See Justine Nolan, 
‘Rana Plaza: The Collapse of a Factory in Bangladesh and its Ramifications for the Global 
Garment Industry’ in Dorothée Baumann-Pauly and Justine Nolan (eds), Business and Human 
Rights — From Principle to Practice (Routledge, 2016) 27–30. 
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as ‘host’. Nevertheless, the term will be used here in accordance with the 
terminology generally used. As will be shown in the next Part, the host state 
has a human rights obligation to protect individuals against human rights 
violations by other private entities through adopting, implementing and 
enforcing relevant regulation such as labour, safety and environmental laws and 
through providing effective judicial remedies.  
The state in which the main seat of the mother company or the global buyer is 
located is the ‘home state’. Again, the term is misleading, but will be used for 
practical reasons. Whether or not a home state also has human rights obligations 
in a transnational business context — in particular a duty to regulate 
transnational business activities or to provide judicial remedies for the victims 
— will be the main question addressed in this article.  
III SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN A 
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS CONTEXT 
A Human Rights Obligations of States and 
Multinational Enterprises 
International human rights norms are based on global and regional human rights 
treaties and on customary international law.13 These norms are formally binding 
only on states as the primary subjects of public international law and hence the 
primary duty-bearers of international human rights. Non-state actors, including 
multinational enterprises or other business enterprises, are not bound by 
international human rights law as they are typically not seen as subjects of 
international law.14 
This does not mean that enterprises which are engaged in transnational business 
activities escape any binding obligations. Obligations of enterprises, such as the 
obligation to maintain proper labour and employment conditions, the health and 
safety of the population and the environment are usually established in 
domestic law and often based on international norms and standards. It is 
important to realise that international human rights norms may require states to 
adopt and implement regulations, yet these international norms and standards 
                                                 
13 Christine Chinkin, ‘Sources’ in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran 
(eds), International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2017) 75. 
14 Gatto, above n 1, 93; Crawford, above n 1, 122; Muchlinski, above n 1, 515. 
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are not themselves binding on multinational enterprises or, for that matter, any 
other business entities.  
Attempts to create binding norms for multinational enterprises have so far 
failed at the international level.15 However, various international non-binding 
standards establish a corporate responsibility to respect human rights. The most 
prominent international standard in this regard is the United Nations Guiding 
Principles for Business and Human Rights developed by the UN Special 
Representative, John Ruggie, and adopted by the UN Human Rights Council in 
2011.16 This framework of principles consists of three pillars, 1) the state duty 
to protect, 2) the corporate responsibility to respect, and 3) access to remedies. 
It urges companies to engage in human rights due diligence in order to avoid 
contributing — directly or indirectly — to human rights violations. Other 
important standards which partly build on the UN Guiding Principles are the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the recently revised ILO’s 
Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy. 
Contemporary international human rights law doctrine distinguishes three 
different dimensions of state obligations arising from international human 
rights treaties: 1) the duty to respect, 2) the duty to protect, and 3) the duty to 
fulfil. This trichotomy was originally developed by the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, but it is now accepted by other treaty 
organs and received favourably in the literature.17  
The duty to respect prohibits direct interference by the state in areas protected 
by human rights. It is therefore structured as a right directed against state 
measures and requiring the state to terminate or withdraw such measures.18 The 
duty to protect requires state measures — on the legislative, administrative or 
judicial levels — to protect human rights against violations and abuses by third 
parties.19 Hence, the duty to protect also forms a basis for state regulations of 
business activities. The duty to fulfil requires the state to ensure that the 
                                                 
15 David Weissbrodt and Muria Kruger, ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ (2003) 97 
American Journal of International Law 901; Detlev F Vagts, ‘The UN Norms for Transnational 
Corporations’ (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 795. 
16 Guiding Principles, above n 4. 
17 Olivier de Schutter, International Human Rights Law (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 
2014) 279–90; Frédéric Mégret, ‘Nature of Obligations’ in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and 
Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds), International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 
2017) 101. 
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substantive contents of rights are fulfilled, either through encouraging and 
enabling others to provide certain basic services and infrastructure (schools, 
hospitals, water and sanitation, and so forth) or through providing these services 
and infrastructure directly.20 For the purposes of the present analysis, the duty 
to protect is the most relevant state obligation, which is why the remainder of 
this article will focus on this dimension only. 
The duty to protect requires the state to adopt and implement effective measures 
to prevent human rights violations by third parties.  According to established 
jurisprudence of the treaty bodies monitoring the implementation of the 
different human rights treaties, this also includes the adoption and 
implementation of laws preventing or mitigating human rights violations.21 
This involves civil and criminal provisions with adequate sanctions22 as well as 
labour, health and security regulations. A state violates its human rights 
obligations if it refuses to grant protection to individuals in cases of negative 
impacts on the human rights of these individuals. Consequently, the state is not 
only required to adopt laws, but also to ensure their effective implementation 
and enforcement through the administrative bodies and courts of that state. 
Finally, the state must monitor the protection it offers, especially after a new 
law is passed, to ensure it is effective. 
The duty to protect is borne by the state in which the human rights violations 
took place. This state has all regulatory powers at its disposal based on the 
principle of territorial jurisdiction.23 Based on this, the state can exercise control 
over local companies as well as subsidiaries and branches of multinational 
enterprises based on its territory. The territorial state can therefore also regulate 
the activities of multinational enterprises and impose labour, health, safety and 
environmental requirements on them. If the subsidiaries of a multinational 
enterprise are incorporated under domestic law — which is often the case — 
the state can also exercise regulatory powers based on the principle of personal 
jurisdiction. 
                                                 
20 Ibid 103. 
21 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31, The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (26 
May 2004) para 7; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 
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22 Silidain v France (European Court of Human Rights, Application No 73316/01, 26 July 2005) 
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Despite the significant regulatory competences of the territorial state, its actual 
capacities to implement and enforce the respective legislation are often 
limited.24 This is especially the case in states with structurally weak legal and 
administrative systems which are often not able to effectively control 
transnational business activities, or are unwilling to do so because of the fear 
of discouraging foreign investors. Frequently corruption exacerbates the 
problem. This is why the fulfilment of the territorial state’s duty to protect is 
often inefficient from a human rights perspective. As a consequence, many have 
argued that the so-called home states should bear a greater responsibility in this 
regard.25 However, this raises the question of whether the home states have the 
competence to regulate the activities of business enterprises even if those 
activities occur outside of the territory of the regulating state. 
B Territorial and Extraterritorial Scope 
Human rights generally apply subject to the jurisdiction of the state in 
question.26 As mentioned above, states exercise full jurisdiction over their 
entire territory by virtue of territorial sovereignty. Hence, all individuals who 
are physically on the state’s territory are protected by whichever human rights 
are enshrined in the law of that state.  
Under general international law it is accepted that states may exercise 
jurisdiction outside of their territory. This is the case for ships sailing under the 
state’s flag as per article 92 paragraph 1 of the United Nations Convention of 
the Law of the Seas or in the case of a military occupation.27 Moreover, human 
rights courts and treaty bodies have applied human rights treaties in situations 
in which the state exercised ‘full and exclusive control’ over an individual 
                                                 
24 Marion Weschka, ‘Human Rights and Multinational Enterprises: How Can Multinational 
Enterprises Be Held Responsible for Human Rights Violations Committed Abroad?’ (2006) 66 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 625, 628–9. 
25 Sara L Seck, ‘Conceptualizing the Home State Duty to Protect Human Rights’ in Karin 
Buhmann, Lynn Roseberry and Mette Morsing (eds), Corporate Social and Human Rights 
Responsibilities (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 25; Wouter Vandenhole, ‘Contextualising the 
State Duty to Protect Human Rights as Defined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights’ [2012] Revista de Estudios Jurídicos 1. 
26 De Schutter, above n 17, 148; Sarah Joseph and Adam Fletcher, ‘Scope of Application’ in 
Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds), International Human Rights 
Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2017) 129. 
27 Loizidou v Turkey (European Court of Human Rights, Application No 15318/89, 18 December 
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outside the state’s territory.28 The Human Rights Committee held as early as 
1981 that human rights treaties apply if state agents abduct an individual and 
keep him or her in a foreign country.29 
While these questions relate to the scope of the application of human rights, it 
is another question whether a state is obliged to regulate the activities of private 
actors if these activities have negative effects on the full enjoyment of human 
rights outside that state’s territory. The UN Guiding Principles seem to take a 
conservative stand on this issue. Principle 2 states: ‘States should set out clearly 
the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or 
jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their operations.’ The commentary 
to this principle explains: 
At present States are not generally required under international human rights 
law to regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their 
territory and/or jurisdiction. Nor are they generally prohibited from doing so, 
provided there is a recognized jurisdictional basis. Within these parameters 
some human rights treaty bodies recommend that home States take steps to 
prevent abuse abroad by business enterprises within their jurisdiction.30  
The UN Guiding Principles therefore convey the view that states are allowed, 
but not obliged, to regulate the behaviour of private actors with respect to its 
impact on human rights abroad.31  
Contrary to this, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) — the body overseeing the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights — stated in its 2017 General Comment No 24 on 
Human Rights in the Context of Business Activities that, in its view, ‘States 
Parties’ obligations under the Covenant do not stop at their territorial borders.’ 
Instead, the Committee was of the opinion that states  
are required to take the necessary steps to prevent human rights violations 
abroad by corporations domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction 
(whether they are incorporated under their laws, or have their statutory seat, 
                                                 
28 Hirsi Jamaa v Italy (European Court of Human Rights, Application No 27765, 23 February 
2012) [73]. 
29 Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No R 12/52, UN Doc Supp No 40 (A/36/40) 
176 (1981) para 12.1 (Lopez Burgos v Uruguay). 
30 Office of the High Commission on Human Rights, United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights — Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework (United Nations, 2011) 3–4. 
31 For a critique of this approach see Olivier de Schutter, ‘Towards a New Treaty on Business 
and Human Rights’ (2016) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 41, 45–6. 
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central administration or principal place of business on the national territory), 
without infringing the sovereignty or diminishing the obligations of the host 
States under the Covenant.32  
With respect to the duty to protect, the Committee stated that, even though 
states would normally not be directly internationally responsible for a violation 
of human rights caused by a private entity, a State party ‘would be in breach of 
its obligations under the Covenant where the violation reveals a failure by the 
State to take reasonable measures that could have prevented the occurrence of 
the event’.33 Moreover,  
[t]he responsibility of the State can be engaged in such circumstances even if 
other causes have also contributed to the occurrence of the violation, and even 
if the State had not foreseen that a violation would occur, provided such a 
violation was reasonably foreseeable.34 
A few years earlier, the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) stated a 
similar view in its General Comment No 16 on State Obligations regarding the 
Impact of the Business Sector on Children’s Rights.35 The CRC stated that 
home states have obligations to respect, protect and fulfil children’s rights in 
the context of businesses’ extraterritorial activities and operations, ‘provided 
that there is a reasonable link between the State and the conduct concerned’.36 
The CRC was of the opinion that such a reasonable link existed ‘when a 
business enterprise has its centre of activity, is registered or domiciled or has 
its main place of business or substantial business activities in the State 
concerned’.37 
As neither the commentary on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights nor the CESCR in its General Comment No 24 offers a 
justification — based on human rights and general international law doctrine 
— of the views expressed, the next Part will attempt an analysis of this question. 
                                                 
32 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No 24 on 
State Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
in the Context of Business Activities, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/24 (23 June 2017) para 26. 
33 CESCR, above n 32, para 32. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General Comment No 16 (2013) on State 
Obligations regarding the Impact of the Business Sector on Children’s Rights, UN Doc 
CRC/C/GC/16 (17 April 2013). 
36 Ibid para 43. 
37 Ibid. 
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IV HOME STATE DUTY TO REGULATE TRANSNATIONAL 
BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 
A Home State Regulation as Reaction to Regulatory 
Failure in Host States?  
As pointed out above, it is regularly argued that host states often lack the 
necessary governance capacities or willingness to enforce laws addressing 
social, labour and environmental concerns. Furthermore, those states are 
threatened with the withdrawal of business if strong protective standards are 
enforced, a threat known as the ‘race-to-the-bottom’ threat. The perceived 
inability or unwillingness of host states to discharge their human rights duties 
leads, in the view of commentators, to a significant gap in the traditional, 
territorial approach to protecting human rights.38 It should also be kept in mind 
that, regardless of the host state’s capacity, it can only target the local subsidiary 
or supplier which is often the weaker partner. Unlike the supplier, the mother 
company of a multinational enterprise, or the ordering company in a global 
supply chain, typically remains outside of the reach of the host state. However, 
it is this company that is often the more powerful global player and that also 
bears responsibility for situations in which human rights violations occur. This 
is why many human rights activists and scholars have argued for a 
responsibility to be placed on home states as they have a direct influence on, 
and jurisdiction over, mother companies or global ordering companies based 
on principles of personal and territorial jurisdiction.  
However, if the duty of home states to protect against human rights violations 
in transnational business contexts is predominantly justified by reference to the 
deficiencies in the regulatory and judicial systems of host states, the foundation 
of home state responsibility lacks a crucial element. Home states bear an 
independent obligation to regulate to protect human rights because of their own 
responsibility. Home states also benefit from global supply chains and from the 
structure of multinational enterprises, and this benefit is created partly because 
the human rights risks created by transnational business are shifted to the 
countries of production, that is, the host states. The case for a home state duty 
to regulate transnational business activities rests therefore not only — and 
perhaps not at all — on regulatory failure or judicial deficiencies in host states, 
but on the independent responsibility of home states. In fact, the home states’ 
                                                 
38 Nadia Bernaz, Business and Human Rights: History, Law and Policy — Bridging the 
Accountability Gap (Routledge, 2017) 231; Daniel Augenstein, ‘Paradise Lost: Sovereign State 
Interest, Global Resource Exploitation and the Politics of Human Rights’ (2016) 27 European 
Journal of International Law 669, 682–3. 
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unwillingness to regulate transnational business activities contributes to human 
rights violations in other countries. Human rights responsibility is established 
along the value chain in home and host states independently of each other.  
The preceding arguments have presented the case for home state regulation on 
a human rights policy basis. However, such a case must also rest on a sound 
doctrinal base which will now be developed. 
B Doctrinal Basis in General International Law 
General public international law is based on the doctrine of territorial 
sovereignty. However, sovereignty under international law is not absolute. In 
fact, a state may not use its territory to harm another state. While the origin of 
the ‘no harm’ rule (sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas) in Roman law is 
disputed, it is generally agreed that the principle is common to various property 
law regimes.39 
The no harm rule in international law was articulated most prominently in the 
Trail Smelter arbitration. As early as 1941 the tribunal in that case stated that  
no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner 
as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties 
or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is 
established by clear and convincing evidence.40  
The principle that a state may not use its territory, or allow the use of its 
territory, to cause significant negative effects on the territory of other states is 
now considered an element of customary international environmental law.41  
While the principle is well established in environmental law, it is less clear 
whether it can also be found in other areas of international law.42 In the Corfu 
Channel case the International Court of Justice (ICJ) established the no harm 
rule as a general principle of international law when it held that it was ‘every 
State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts 
                                                 
39 Jutta Brunnée, ‘Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (March 2010) [2] <http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL>. 
40 Trail Smelter case (United States v Canada) [1938, 1941] 3 UNRIAA 1905, 1965. 
41 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226 
[29].  
42 Brunnée, above n 39, [10]–[11]. 
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contrary to the rights of other States’.43 This ruling clarifies that the no harm 
rule does not apply only between directly neighbouring states, but that every 
state has to be mindful of the rights of other states. 
One manifestation of the no harm principle outside of international 
environmental law can be found in the international law against terrorism. The 
state’s duties are twofold: 1) to prevent the infiltration of terrorists into, or 
residence in, the state’s territories and 2) to refrain from giving refuge to, 
training, arming, financing or providing any facilities to, terrorists. These duties 
are based on the idea that the territory of one state may not be used by private 
parties to cause significant harm to other states.44 Similarly, general 
international criminal law requires that states do not give shelter to persons who 
have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, but that 
states either extradite or prosecute them (aut dedere aut judicare).45 
It may be too early to derive from the above principles a general and all-
encompassing principle of international law which requires the state to aim to 
prevent every significant negative effect on other states. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that one could argue that states are required to prevent individuals using their 
territories to conduct activities which have significant negative effects on other 
states. This principle could also be applied in the human rights context. Bartels 
seems to reject this view by arguing that the no harm rule ‘applies only to harm 
caused by physical agents’ and not to harm ‘caused by a mere policy decision 
(by a state or a private actor) taken within the territory of an allegedly 
responsible state’.46 However, the relevant international cases do not support 
this perspective. The decisive point in these cases was the lack of a state’s action 
to prevent a private actor from engaging in harmful activity. There is no 
compelling reason why this principle could not be applied in the context of 
transnational business activities. However, it should be noted that there is no 
supporting practice by human rights courts or committees so far.47 
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C Doctrinal Basis in Human Rights Law 
If one accepts a general obligation of states to ensure that their territory may 
not be used to cause significant harm to another state and if one connects this 
obligation to the general human rights duty to protect, it can be argued that a 
state is obliged to act if individuals in its territory cause significant harm to 
human rights on the territory of another state.48 The state can discharge this 
obligation by regulating the activities of businesses in a transnational context. 
While the no harm principle can be seen as the basis for such an obligation, it 
is unclear how far this obligation extends. 
It should be noted that the question of the territorial reach of a human rights 
duty to protect needs to be distinguished from the question of the extraterritorial 
application of human rights or the jurisdictional scope of a human rights treaty 
as discussed above. Instead, it is a question of the scope of the duty to protect. 
From a general human rights perspective, it seems difficult to argue that this 
duty should be limited to the human rights of the individuals living on the 
territory of the state in question. If one were to accept this view, the 
environment in other states would be better protected through human rights 
than human beings are. There is, however, no normative or doctrinal principle 
which would support the idea that a state must not also take the rights of those 
into account who live outside of the territory of the state. In fact, the very idea 
of the universality of human rights suggests that there can be no reasonable 
argument for limiting the state’s obligations to events occurring in its own 
territory.49  
As a consequence, human rights need to be reconstructed as a relational and not 
as a territorial concept.50 The dominant question is not ‘Where do human rights 
apply?’ but rather ‘Whom do human rights protect?’ This could lead to a 
functional understanding of jurisdiction in human rights law instead of a 
territorial approach. It is worth recalling that, as early as 1981, the Human 
Rights Committee held in the famous Lopez Burgos case that the reference to 
jurisdiction in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is ‘not 
to the place where the violation occurred, but rather to the relationship between 
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the individual and the State’.51 Jurisdiction could then be construed on the basis 
of the effectiveness of human rights protection. In other words, the state on 
whose territory a human rights violation occurs would have jurisdiction not due 
to the principle of territoriality, but because its activities would be the most 
effective way to mitigate or prevent human rights violations.  
One of the key questions concerning any general state obligation to ensure that 
its territory is not used for significant human rights violations in other countries 
by private parties is when this obligation would arise. While the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child seemed to assume that any ‘reasonable link’52 between 
the home state’s acts (or failures to act) and the foreign violation would be 
sufficient, without specifying further the relationship between the home state 
and the violation, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
relied on two conditions.53 First, the Committee asserted, it needs to be shown 
that an activity of the home state could have prevented the human rights 
violation in the other state. Second, the connection between the human rights 
violation and the failure of the state to act had to be foreseeable. The Committee 
used the risk of human rights violations associated with the extractive 
industries, especially mining — a sector which is notorious for human rights 
violations — as an example of a generally foreseeable risk.54 
Based on this approach it can be argued that a state is required in the above 
circumstances to take regulatory measures, involving legislative, administrative 
and judicial activities, to prevent human rights violations in other countries. 
Effective human rights protection, in short, requires state actions if adverse 
human rights effects in other countries caused by private actors are predictable 
and preventable.55  
Arguably, this approach is in line with the no harm principle discussed above, 
because a violation of human rights can be seen as harm done to another 
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country. The no harm principle would add a third requirement to the notions of 
predictability and preventability. Minor human rights violations or negative 
effects on human rights in the host country would be insufficient to trigger the 
home state’s responsibility. Rather, the human rights violation would need to 
be of a significant and serious nature. Direct violations of the right to life or 
other fundamental rights of physical integrity and human dignity would be of 
greater significance than indirect contributions to negative impacts on the 
environment. 
D Principle of Non-Intervention as Limitation? 
It has sometimes been argued that establishing a state’s duty to regulate 
transnational activities of business entities could be seen as an unwelcome 
interference in the internal affairs of the state where the human rights violation 
occurred. At the outset, it should be noted that regulating private actors 
which/who are domiciled in the regulating state is not an exercise of 
extraterritorial sovereignty. In its General Comment No 24, the CESCR rightly 
underlined the fact that,  
although the imposition of such due diligence obligations does have impacts 
on situations located outside these States’ national territories since potential 
violations of Covenant rights in global supply chains or in multinational 
groups of companies should be prevented or addressed, this does not imply 
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the States concerned.56  
Indeed, states may not regulate or exercise jurisdiction over activities on foreign 
territory without the consent of the state concerned unless they do so pursuant 
to some recognised exception to the territoriality principle such as the principle 
of universality in international criminal law.  
While it is clear that regulating the foreign activities of private entities over 
which a state exercises jurisdiction cannot be regarded as the extraterritorial 
exercise of jurisdiction, it could still be asked whether the state is unduly 
influencing the political, economic or legal system of another state to an extent 
which would be considered a violation of the principle of non-intervention. As 
clearly stated in the UN General Assembly’s Friendly Relations Resolution of 
1970 ‘[e]very State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, 
social and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another 
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State.’57 Consequently, states are not allowed to ‘intervene, directly or 
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any 
other State’.58 This prohibition includes all forms of interference in the political, 
economic and cultural elements of the personality of the state. Also, states may 
not  
use or encourage the use of economic political or any other type of measures 
to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the 
exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.59  
However, the principle of non-intervention does not contain an absolute 
prohibition of any influence exercised by one state over another state if the 
former acts within the boundaries of international law. In its famous Nicaragua 
judgment, the ICJ held that an intervention is only prohibited if it bears 
on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State 
sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political, 
economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy.60  
Unless the intervention is conducted using military means or other forms of 
coercion which are prohibited per se, an intervention is prohibited only if it 
relates to a matter that concerns solely the ‘domestic affairs’ of the target state. 
Broadly speaking, domestic affairs are all matters which are not covered by 
international obligations based on treaties or customary international law.61 As 
a consequence, a state may therefore not rely on the principle of non-
intervention to reject interferences which aim at protecting fundamental human 
rights. 
If one applies the above interpretation of the non-intervention principle to the 
state duty to regulate transnational business activities, it can be argued that a 
regulation requiring private entities to ensure their subsidiaries’ or suppliers’ 
adherence to the law of the state in which they operate — even if that law is not 
consistently applied or enforced in that state — would never be a violation of 
the principle of non-intervention. This is because respect for existing laws does 
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not negatively affect the social, political or economic system of a state. Matters 
are more difficult if the regulation of transnational business activities in the 
home state provides incentives for local companies in the host state to deviate 
from existing laws. Generally, it could be argued that an activity by one state 
which aims at producing non-compliance with existing domestic law in another 
state may amount to an intervention in the internal affairs of the other state. If, 
however, the laws of the other state violate the human rights obligations of that 
state the principle of non-intervention could not be invoked. For example, if a 
host state prohibits the formation of trade unions in violation of article 8 
paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, that state could not rely on the principle of non-intervention if another 
state engaged in activities which aimed at ensuring that the host state met its 
obligations under the relevant human rights treaty. 
Only if, and to the extent that, a state is not bound by specific human rights 
obligations, including those arising under customary human rights law, might 
it be possible for that state to rely on the principle of non-intervention. In such 
a case, the non-intervention principle could indeed become a limitation on the 
right of other states to regulate transnational business activities. To use a 
concrete example: If State A prohibits corporation X, which is domiciled in its 
territory, from concluding contracts with corporation Y in State B unless trade 
unions are able to operate freely in corporation Y, and if trade unions are 
prohibited in State B, then State A’s prohibition could be seen as an intervention 
in the internal affairs of State B if the prohibition of trade unions does not 
violate State B’s obligations under international human rights law. 
E State Duty to Regulate Transnational Business 
Activities in the Draft of an International Legally 
Binding Instrument on Business and Human Rights 
One of the most interesting and innovative developments in the context of 
business and human rights concerns the re-emergence of the idea of creating 
binding obligations for business entities through an international human rights 
law instrument.62 In 2014, the United Nations Human Rights Council 
established an open-ended intergovernmental working group (OEIGWG) on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human 
rights and gave it the mandate ‘to elaborate an international legally binding 
instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of 
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transnational corporations and other business enterprises’.63 The OEIGWG 
held two sessions in 2015 and 2016 devoted to information sharing and 
deliberation.64 Prior to the third session in 2017, the Chair of the OEIGWG 
published a paper which outlined the possible elements of a treaty on business 
and human rights (the ‘Elements Paper’).65 Based on this paper, the OEIGWG 
held a number of formal and informal sessions and discussed the potential 
elements of a binding treaty even though a number of countries and the EU still 
oppose the establishment of a binding legal instrument. 
In July 2018, the Chair of the OEIGWG published a so-called ‘Zero Draft’ of 
an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human 
rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises.66 Even though this draft will only be the basis for future 
negotiations and it is hence unclear whether, and to what extent, elements of 
the draft will become parts of a treaty, it is noteworthy that certain provisions 
of the draft can be read as a codification of the state duty to regulate 
transnational business activities with respect to human rights. 
Article 9 paragraph 1 of the Zero Draft on ‘Prevention’ obliges states to  
ensure in their domestic legislation that all persons with business activities of 
transnational character within such State Parties’ territory or otherwise under 
their jurisdiction or control shall undertake due diligence obligations 
throughout such business activities…  
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Furthermore, article 10 paragraph 1 of the Zero Draft on ‘Legal Liability’ states 
that:  
State Parties shall ensure through their domestic law that natural and legal 
persons may be held criminally, civil [sic] or administratively liable for 
violations of human rights undertaken in the context of business activities of 
transnational character.  
In particular, according to paragraph 6 of article 10:  
All persons with business activities of a transnational character shall be liable 
for harm caused by violations of human rights arising in the context of their 
business activities, including throughout their operations,  
a. to the extent it [sic] exercises control over the operations, or  
b. to the extent it [sic] exhibits a sufficiently close relation with its 
subsidiary or entity in its supply chain and where there is strong and 
direct connection between its conduct and the wrong suffered by the 
victim, or  
c. to the extent risk have [sic] been foreseen or should have been foreseen 
of human rights violations within its chain of economic activity.  
‘Business activities of a transnational character’ are defined in article 4 
paragraph 2 of the Zero Draft as economic activities ‘that take place or involve 
actions, persons or impact in two or more national jurisdictions’.   
These provisions would require state parties to the proposed treaty to adopt and 
implement legislation which requires business entities to undertake human 
rights due diligence in all areas of their business activities, including their 
supply chains, and to adopt and implement legislation which establishes the 
liability of business entities for harm caused by human rights violations. As it 
is clear that the treaty would apply to business activities of a transnational 
character, the provisions oblige states to regulate business activities in light of 
their impact on human rights outside of the territory of the regulating state. 
Read together, these provisions establish a state duty to protect against human 
rights violations caused or contributed to by business actors in a transnational 
context.67 Regardless of whether the draft will materialise as an international 
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agreement or whether it will suffer the same fate as earlier attempts to create 
binding norms for transnational corporations, the draft is clear evidence of a 
trend towards clarifying and articulating the state duty to protect against human 
rights violations in transnational business contexts.  
V APPROACHES IN STATE PRACTICE 
Even though international human rights law still falls short of an explicit 
recognition of the state duty to protect against human rights violations through 
transnational business activities, recent developments in state practice 
concerning business and human rights provide examples of how states could 
discharge such an obligation. Three broad trends are emerging. The first 
approach relies on civil liability in the states where mother companies or global 
ordering companies are domiciled. While there have been many high-profile 
cases in recent years, it is still unclear if any civil case has ever led to the 
establishment of company liability. The second approach focuses on 
transparency and disclosure obligations, requiring businesses to report whether 
and, if so, how they have encountered and addressed human rights violations 
and risks thereof in their business relations. Finally, the third approach involves 
domestic regulations which specifically establish rules on how companies 
should conduct human rights due diligence and live up to their human rights 
responsibilities. These will be discussed in turn below. 
A Civil Liability 
Over the last fifteen to twenty years claimants have filed human rights writs in 
courts of the home states of multinational companies, with varying degrees of 
success. Usually, the claims were based on tort law. They argued that mother 
companies or lead companies in global supply chains had caused violations of 
life, physical integrity or property through the activities of their subsidiaries or 
suppliers in other countries. The liability of the mother companies or lead 
companies was based on the contributions of these companies to the situation 
or events that led to the respective torts.68 
The first and hitherto most prominent cases were based on an old US law, the 
Alien Tort Statute (ATS) (also known as the Alien Tort Claims Act or ATCA).69 
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According to this law, which was enacted in 1789, the US District Courts have 
original jurisdiction over civil actions by foreigners for torts ‘committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.’70 Until the 1980s 
the law was hardly ever used and not known to many. However, it was then 
used to found claims by victims of torture from abroad against their torturers 
who had taken up residence in the US.71 From the early 2000s claimants began 
to use the ATS as a basis for law suits against US and foreign corporations 
because of their alleged contributions to violations of human rights and 
environmental standards.72 Even though most cases did not lead to final 
judgments against corporate defendants, litigation based on the ATS continued 
for more than a decade until the US Supreme Court held in two landmark cases 
that the ATS could not be used against corporations and would not apply in 
situations which had no connection to US territory.73 While these judgments 
foreclosed any further actions based on the ATS in federal courts, human rights 
litigation in the US may continue on the basis of state tort law and in state 
courts.74 
Victims of human rights violations have also started to issue proceedings in the 
courts of Europe and elsewhere. Examples include tort litigation against 
multinational enterprises in English courts,75 claims filed in the Netherlands 
against Royal Dutch Shell plc,76 and a lawsuit against the German textile 
company KiK in the Dortmund regional court.77  
There have also been arguments that, in addition to, or instead of, tortious 
liability, directors or CEOs of companies which have been connected with 
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human rights violations could be held accountable on the basis of corporate 
liability.78 The key question is whether the duty of care of directors or managers 
towards the corporation or the shareholders includes a duty to respect human 
rights. According to conventional approaches, directors’ and managers’ duties 
are only concerned with the monetary value of the company and not its 
reputation or impact on its stakeholders.79 If, however, the nature of a 
corporation is not reduced to pecuniary interests, it could be argued that the 
decision-makers in a company are also responsible for its corporate conduct in 
relation to human rights. 
B Transparency and Disclosure 
Another approach — arguably the least intrusive — concerns the requirements 
of transparency and disclosure in relation to a company’s transnational business 
activities.80 Broadly speaking, the obligations in this category include the duty 
to disclose certain facts, connections and information relating to the observance 
of human rights by the company and its subsidiaries and within its supply chain. 
Transparency requirements of this kind pertain not only to human rights but 
extend to other obligations arising from Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR).81 
Disclosure obligations gained attention for the first time in the context of human 
rights when the so-called Dodd-Frank Act was adopted in the US in 2010.82 
One aspect of this law, which was predominantly a reaction to the financial 
crisis of 2007 and 2008, concerned so-called conflict minerals from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).83 According to the Dodd-Frank Act, 
companies listed on the stock exchange were required to report publicly if 
certain conflict minerals were traded in their supply chains and if these minerals 
were from the DRC or neighbouring states. They were to report which due 
diligence measures had been adopted at the mining site and throughout the 
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supply chain.84 This approach was therefore restricted to certain products and a 
certain region and hence also to very specific human rights violations. 
Similar transparency requirements — also limited to particular situations or 
human rights violations — can be found in the UK Modern Slavery Act 201585 
and the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act.86 Both laws require that 
companies of a certain size report whether there are instances of slavery or 
inhumane working conditions in their supply chain or whether there is a risk of 
such instances, and what the companies intend to do about it. A similar 
approach can be found in the proposed Law against Child Labour which is 
currently before the Dutch Parliament.87 
The so-called EU CSR-Directive on Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity 
Information contains broader, but also more general, transparency 
requirements.88 This directive requires that corporations of a certain size 
include in their management report a non-financial statement containing 
information on the impact of their activities on environmental, social and 
employee matters, respect for human rights, and anti-corruption and bribery 
matters. In order to report on human rights matters, corporations may rely on 
international frameworks such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the 
International Labour Organization’s (ILO’s) Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy. If 
companies do not rely on any of these standards, they need to explain this 
choice. 
Transparency and disclosure requirements are regulatory instruments of limited 
intensity and intrusion. The affected companies need only to publish a 
declaration or statement and are not required to change their behaviour. While 
wrongful reporting may trigger liability, a potential claimant would have to 
                                                 
84 For a critical analysis see Patrick Keenan, ‘United States Law and Conflict Minerals’ in Isabel 
Feichtner, Markus Krajewski and Ricarda Roesch (eds), Human Rights in the Extractive 
Industries: Transparency, Participation, Resistance (Springer, forthcoming).  
85 Ryan Turner, ‘Transnational Supply Chain Regulation: Extraterritorial Regulation as 
Corporate Law’s New Frontier’ (2016) 17 Melbourne Journal of International Law 188–209. 
86 Alexandra Prokopets, ‘Trafficking in Information: Evaluating the Efficacy of the California 
Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010’ (2014) 37 Hastings International and 
Comparative Law Review 351. 
87 Eerste Kamer der Staten-General, Initiatiefvoorstel-Kuiken Wet zorgplicht kinderarbeid, 
<https://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/34506_initiatiefvoorstel_kuiken>.  
88 Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 
amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity 
Information by Certain Large Undertakings and Groups [2014] OJ L 330/1. 
2018 THE STATE DUTY TO PROTECT AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 37 
show that damage had been caused by, or could be directly linked to, the 
wrongful reports. The main objective of transparency requirements is hence the 
information of consumers.89 While this may also have an indirect effect on the 
behaviour of the companies, the regulatory impact seems to be limited.90 
C Due Diligence Requirements 
One of the key elements of the corporate obligation to respect human rights is 
the notion of human rights due diligence as stipulated in Principle 17 of the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.91 While the Guiding 
Principles do not impose a legally binding obligation on companies to 
undertake human rights due diligence, calls for home state regulations to make 
human rights due diligence binding on companies are increasing. Such laws 
would oblige companies to assess human rights risks, investigate human rights 
abuses, adopt action plans and report on them. 
The French law on due diligence for mother companies and international 
ordering companies, enacted in March 2017 (Loi relative au devoir de vigilance 
des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre),92 is the first 
comprehensive law of this kind. It obliges companies of a certain size to adopt 
a due diligence plan (plan de vigilance) which has to identify the human rights 
risks in the corporation’s own activities and in its supply chain. However, the 
law does not specify the details of such a plan. Instead it enables the Conseil 
d’Etat to adopt further regulations. Originally, the law also imposed fines on 
non-complying companies, but the French Conseil constitutionnel 
                                                 
89 Prokopets, above n 86, 357. 
90 Ibid 365. 
91 ‘In order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their adverse human 
rights impacts, business enterprises should carry out human rights due diligence. The process 
should include assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon 
the findings, tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed. Human rights 
due diligence: (a) Should cover adverse human rights impacts that the business enterprise may 
cause or contribute to through its own activities, or which may be directly linked to its 
operations, products or services by its business relationships; (b) Will vary in complexity with 
the size of the business enterprise, the risk of severe human rights impacts, and the nature and 
context of its operations; (c) Should be ongoing, recognizing that the human rights risks may 
change over time as the business enterprise’s operations and operating context evolve.’  
92 Loi n° 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des 
entreprises donneuses d'ordre (France), JO, No 74, 28 March 2017 <https://www. 
legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2017/3/27/2017-399/jo/texte>. 
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[Constitutional Court] declared these to be unconstitutional.93 It will now be up 
to French courts in other proceedings, and to business practice, to determine 
further details.  
Another example, which also establishes binding due diligence requirements 
but which is far less ambitious in scope and impact than the French law, is the 
EU regulation on supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers 
of so-called ‘conflict minerals’.94 Similar to the Dodd-Frank Act, this regulation 
concerns conflict minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo, but applies 
only to importers. Enterprises processing the relevant minerals are not covered 
by the Regulation. Unlike the Dodd-Frank Act, the EU regulation goes beyond 
imposing reporting requirements, obliging the companies to undertake concrete 
due diligence measures.95 
VI SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
This article has shown that there is a strong case to be made for the existence 
of a state duty to protect against human rights violations in the context of 
transnational business activities. This duty would apply to the regulation of 
mother companies in transnational corporate groups. These companies would 
be obliged to prevent their daughter companies either causing or contributing 
to human rights violations in other countries. The duty would also apply to the 
ordering companies in global supply chains, requiring that they prevent human 
rights violations associated with their local suppliers. 
General public international law, as well as human rights doctrine, provide 
sufficient grounds to argue the existence of a home state duty to regulate 
corporate actors that violate human rights by their transnational business 
activities. It has been shown in this article that states have a duty to regulate the 
transnational business activities of corporations over which they exercise 
jurisdiction if the adverse human rights consequences of such activities are 
predictable and if appropriate regulation could contribute to the prevention of 
such adverse effects.  
                                                 
93 Conseil constitutionnel [French Constitutional Court], decision n° 2017-750 DC, 23 March 
2017 reported in JO, 28 March 2017 <https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/ 
2017/2017750DC.htm>. 
94 Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 
Laying Down Supply Chain Due Diligence Obligations for Union Importers of Tin, Tantalum 
and Tungsten, Their Ores, and Gold Originating from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas 
[2017] OJ L 130/1. 
95 Ibid arts 3–7. 
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While the examples of jurisprudence and legislation affecting transnational 
business activities discussed in this article can be seen as possible articulations 
of a state duty to protect human rights in this context, it is unclear whether, and 
to what extent, the respective states have acted assuming that they are fulfilling 
a human rights obligation. Further research would be needed to show whether 
and, if so, how human rights considerations influence these and similar state 
approaches to the regulation of transnational business. 
